Führen mit Auftrag – Requirements

Führen mit Auftrag – very loosely translated as leading by mission – is the foundational leadership principle in the German armed forces, and has been since the early 1800s. It has the following nine requirements.

Training: Führen mit Auftrag requires well-trained troops who ideally have been fighting together over a longer period of time. Soldiers should be viewed as masters of their craft. This includes not only expertise in using their weapons, but moreso their overall behaviour when in battle.

Self-confidence and cohesion: The entire group must possess a high degree of self-confidence. Every member, from enlisted soldier to the highest ranking officer, must view themselves as an expert at what they do. The officers should be proud to lead such troops. They should identify themselves with their troops and not have an eye on their next promotion.

Acceptance: Officers should accept soldiers who take different approaches as long as the overall goal is reached. Officers should not get too involved on the tactical level, thus allowing soldiers to develop their skills. Too early, too much involvement on the tactical level frustrates self-leading soldiers.

Trust: Officers and soldiers need to trust each other. Officers cover for their soldiers when things go wrong. Mistakes are either not punished or at least not immediately. Common thinking and acting is critical. It is based on common training.

Information: Detailed information is important, especially explaining the strategic thinking behind individual missions. Soldiers need to understand the big picture, the broader context in which they are operating. Officers take seriously input provided by the tactical level, thereby encouraging soldiers to think and act independently.

Few orders: Commanding officers state only the mission, provide necessary resources and makes sure that participating organizations coordinate their activities. Everything else is left to the tactical level, which makes their own decisions about how to complete the mission. Leadership is decentralized.

Motivation: Commanders at the front know best the strengths and weaknesses of their troops, and can best judge the situation. Allowing for independent decision making and action strengthens motivation and morale among the troops. They identify more closely with the overall mission, view themselves as subjects and not objects to be commanded here and there.

Deviation from mission: If the situation on the ground has changed, it is expected of officers and their troops to make the necessary adjustments immediately, even without having informed their next level officer.

Situation analysis: Officers and soldiers at all levels are expected to constantly reassess the situation. What is our overall mission? What are we expected to achieve? Has the situation changed in any way which requires of us to modify our approach? If so, in what way and when?

Führen mit Auftrag – Elements

Führen mit Auftrag – very loosely translated as leading by mission – is the foundational leadership principle in the German armed forces, and has been since the early 1800s. It has six key elements:

1. Decision making: Those with the most expertise should be involved. The team analyzes the Auftrag (mission), the parameters of the situation, and the possible options to complete the mission. This is the basis for making the optimal decision and for maintaining motivation and morale within the team.

2. The Auftrag describes the goal: The core task of military leadership is to issue well-defined Aufträge, missions. The focus is on defining the end state, not the specific action taken to reach it. Define the goal clearly, allow as much tactical freedom as possible. The path to the goal is best defined by those at the front. A clear Auftrag allows the tactical level to make necessary adjustments due to situational changes independent of their leadership.

3. Context and boundary conditions: The Auftrag includes a description of the mission‘s boundary conditions. The tactical level needs to understand how its mission fits into the broader strategic picture. They should be informed and understand the strategic thinking two level above their own. This allows the tactical level to make independent decisions should next-level leadership not be reachable.

4. Resources: Critical to mission completion is providing the tactical level with all necessary resources. Anything less is not only unfair, it threatens team morale and the mission itself. Capable commanders do their best to prevent a gap between mission and resources.

5. Coordination of forces: If the Auftrag requires action by several units, disciplines, organizations, then it is critical to clarify lines of authority and of communication. Overlaps should be avoided, areas of integrated approaches well defined.

6. Communications and reporting: Information flow needs to be set both on the tactical level and between the tactical and strategic levels. Progress reports are critical not only within military units, but also between the military and their civilian commanders.

Powell Doctrine

The Powell Doctrine, named after General Colin Powell, stresses exhausting all political, economic, and diplomatic means, before a nation should resort to military force.

Powell has since expanded the doctrine, stating that when a nation is engaged in war, every resource and tool should be used to achieve decisive force against the enemy, minimizing American casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the enemy to capitulate.

Deploy. To extend a military unit especially in width; to place in battle formation or appropriate positions; to spread out, utilize, or arrange for a deliberate purpose. From French déployer, literally, to unfold.

“I am not convinced!“

Entschuldigen Sie, ich bin nicht überzeugt! – “Excuse me, I am not convinced!“ In 2003, at the International Security Conference in Munich, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer ended the debate against his American colleague Donald Rumsfeld with this reproachful outcry.

But what had happened? Of what was Fischer not convinced? The debate was on the topic of aiding the intervention of U.S. military forces in Iraq. Rumsfeld wanted support from Germany, but the German government under the direction of Chancellor Schröder and Fischer strictly declined his request.

At the conference, Rumsfeld was making one last attempt at getting the still-doubtful Germans on board with his agenda. Nevertheless, his reasoning that Iraq was working on weapons of mass destruction, supporting terrorist groups, and ignoring the UN, was not enough to convince the German side.

The evidence was too scant, the intervention plans too poorly prepared, and the timing of the operation seemed badly selected. It would be better just to give diplomacy another chance, rather than send German soldiers into an adventure with an uncertain end and questionable justification.

Presumably, Fischer (a former participant in the student protest movement of 1968) was drawing on more recent German history to strengthen his resolve in declining. And in this case, he now has history on his side; the Iraq war indeed evolved into just the disaster which he had always warned it would be.

2003. The Munich Security Conference. Then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer challenges then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “to make the case” for war in Iraq. Watch mins. 1:00 to 1:25, where Fischer speaks directly to Rumsfeld.