(Bloomberg) — German Chancellor Olaf Scholz faces intense pressure from members of his ruling coalition to step up deliveries of heavy weapons such as tanks and fighter jets to help Ukraine fight Russian troops. After initiating an historic reversal in Germany’s previously frugal defense policy in the early stages of the war, Scholz has since appeared hesitant to go beyond initial supplies.
politics
Scholz “stepping on the brakes”
The Guardian: “Coalition partners accuse Olaf Scholz of failing to live up to promises as major Russian offensive looms”
Germany’s chancellor is under growing pressure to authorise the delivery of heavy weaponry to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s looming eastern offensive, with Olaf Scholz’s coalition partners accusing him of failing to live up to his promises.
“I can only speculate why the chancellor is stepping on the brakes like this. I can see no logical reason for it. But with his actions, the chancellor is not only damaging the situation in Ukraine, but he is also massively damaging Germany’s reputation in Europe and the world.” Anton Hofreiter – leader figure of the Green Party.
Weak link?
Germany wants to come up with a national security strategy (NSS) by the end of 2022. The new government started out with great ambitions in security and defense policy. However, for many allies, Germany seems to be once again a weak link and an unreliable partner in European defense. Instead of focusing on security, it should focus on a strategy for action in the event of conflict. This requires to broaden the concept of security and include more policy fields, especially technology, innovation, and internal security.
Germany’s new government started out with great ambitions in security and defense policy. The first statements and foreign trips of the new government officials to France, Poland, the US, and Ukraine, were reassuring.
However, after this rather ambitious start, hesitations, inconsistent action and messaging vis-à-vis allies, worries about how the German public would perceive government decisions, and irritatingly over-cautious moves towards Russia, have overshadowed initial impressions. For many allies, Germany seems to be once again a weak link and an unreliable partner in European defense.
Germany puts hold on North Stream 2
For weeks the German government was reluctant to commit to including stopping North Stream 2 as a key element in sanctiones against Russia should it invade Ukraine.
BERLIN, Feb 22 (Reuters) – Germany on Tuesday halted the Nord Stream 2 Baltic Sea gas pipeline project, designed to double the flow of Russian gas direct to Germany, after Russia formally recognised two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine.
Europe’s most divisive energy project, worth $11 billion, was finished in September, but has stood idle pending certification by Germany and the European Union.
The pipeline had been set to ease the pressure on European consumers facing record energy prices amid a wider post-pandemic cost of living crisis, and on governments that have already forked out billions to try to cushion the impact on consumers.
Risk too high
February 2022. Politicians and business leaders call for alternatives to Putin’s pipelines.
The country gets a whopping 55 percent of its gas imports from Russia. With the crisis triggered by Vladimir Putin’s belligerence toward Ukraine prompting renewed questions about the reliability of that supply, politicians and business leaders have begun calling for the country to urgently find ways to diversify its energy mix.
“Well. Welcome to the brave new world where Europeans are very soon going to pay €2.000 for 1.000 cubic meters of natural gas!” Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and prime minister who is now deputy chair of the country’s Security Council, tweeted in reaction to Scholz’s move. Just to make sure the message got tweeted in German, too.
Bonn Republic
Die Unbeugsamen (The Indomitables, 2021): This documentary tells the story of women in the Bonn Republic who had to fight persistently and patiently for their participation in democratic decision-making processes. Their long-term, unwavering commitment and refusal to be rushed by societal or political pressures exemplify the German belief that significant decisions require time, perseverance, and careful deliberation.
Transit Agreement (1972)
The first German-German agreement at government level, the Transit Agreement, came into force on June 3, 1972. It facilitated travel between West Germany and West Berlin through East Germany. The agreement was implemented as negotiated, and both sides adhered to its terms with minimal need for ongoing re-confirmation or renegotiation, reflecting the German tendency to treat agreements as binding and self-sustaining once concluded.
Ostpolitik and Inter-German Agreements (1970s)
During the era of Ostpolitik, several treaties and agreements were signed between West Germany and East Germany, as well as with other Eastern Bloc countries. These agreements, such as the Basic Treaty (1972), focused on normalization and were executed with the expectation that both parties would fulfill their commitments without constant follow-up, in line with the German value of reliability in agreements.
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact
The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact exemplifies several core German decision-making strategies, particularly the emphasis on strategic patience, pragmatic calculation, and allowing the nature of the decision-not external pressures-to dictate timing and terms.
Deliberate Negotiation and Timing:
The pact was the result of extended negotiations between Germany and the Soviet Union, following the breakdown of talks between the Soviets, Britain, and France. German leaders did not rush into an agreement but instead waited for the optimal moment-after other diplomatic options had failed-to secure a deal that would best serve their interests. This patience allowed Germany to negotiate from a position of strength and maximize its strategic advantage.
Pragmatic, Interest-Driven Approach:
Despite deep ideological differences, Germany prioritized practical considerations over ideology, focusing on immediate military and territorial objectives. The pact included secret protocols dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence, demonstrating a willingness to set aside personal or political animosities in favor of concrete, performance-based outcomes.
Control Over Decision Pace:
Germany resisted external pressures-such as the urgency from Britain and France to form an anti-German alliance-and instead set the tempo of negotiations to align with its own strategic timetable. This approach reflects the German logic that the time allotted to a decision should be determined by its complexity and importance, not by outside urgency.
Patience in Execution and Adjustment:
After the pact was signed, Germany continued to renegotiate and adjust its terms, as seen in subsequent agreements modifying borders and managing resource exchanges with the Soviet Union. This ongoing, patient adjustment process ensured that decisions remained aligned with evolving strategic needs.
In summary, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact demonstrates German decision-making strategies through measured, pragmatic negotiation; patience in timing and execution; and a consistent focus on achieving well-defined, interest-driven objectives, regardless of external pressure or ideological differences.
Berlin Conference (1884–1885)
The Berlin Conference (1884–1885). Context: Major European powers, including Germany, convened in Berlin to formalize territorial claims in Africa. The conference lasted several months, with extensive negotiations and careful consideration of complex interests before any decisions were finalized. The process was deliberate and patient, reflecting the German preference for thorough analysis rather than rushed conclusions.