Insurance protection

Germans love insurance policies. According to the magazine Stern, the average German household paid an average of 2,771 EUR annually for private insurances in 2002, 106 EUR more than in the previous year. They are clearly willing to spend on their security.

However, the avoidance of risks in this way is often not rational. According to Stern, every other German is insured for legal representation, yet only one in ten have disability insurance. Statistically, however, one out of four people will be unable to work for an extended period of time during their lifetime due to illness or an accident.

The investment counseling agency KSK-Südholstein makes a similar attest: “Germans love to be rooted and secure. That is why they are so keen on insurances. For this reason, there is an incredible variety of insurances available on the German insurance market.

Amongst these policies you will find some which are sensible, and others which really are not, because not every value must be insured. Much to the dismay of experts, there is a tendency in Germany to insure small amounts of damage with high initial ventures.”

Founderland

A willingness to take risks and a desire to make decisions are the basic requirements for starting a business. Germany is not a land of entrepreneurs.

According to Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), an annual joint publication of the University of Hannover and the Institute for Jobmarket and Career Research of the German Federal Agency for Employment, only 2.5% of adults in Germany started a business which they could live from. This placed Germany in spot 10 of the 22 compared.

Rolf Sternberg, an economist, considers one reason for the weak culture of entrepreneurship to be the widespread desire toward security:

“The tendency to strive towards security is much more prevalent in Germany than in Anglo-American countries”. This is the flipside of having a well-developed social security system.

Yvonne Stolpmann of Chamber of Commerce in Nürnberg summarizes the situation as such: “Those who give up a permanent position here stand to lose a lot of security. It’s different in the USA”.

Frederick August the Procrastinator

Frederick August, the King of Saxony, was one of history’s great procrastinators. While he began as one of Napoleon’s greatest foes, he soon became his greatest ally. In return, Napoleon elevated him from prince elector to king.

But by 1813, his alliance with Napoleon would cause him to lose the Battle of Leipzig. Though Frederick August was careful in attempting to side himself with the great forces who opposed him, a treaty that he had made with Austria eventually dissolved. Taken into captivity by the Prussians, Frederick August was forced to turn more than half of his territory over to his archrivals.

But why was Frederick August on the losing side of the Battle of Leipzig? Historians consider him to have been incapable of making decisions. He is credited with coining the phrase “no decision is better than a bad decision.”

During the revolt he spent his time sitting almost apathetically in the basement in the city hall of Leipzig. To add to the confusion, Frederick August was an exceptionally unpredictable monarch; very few rulers changed their mind so often.

Not only was he incapable of making decisions, but as soon as a decision was made it essentially would have lost all meaning in the moment of its creation, having already been undermined in significance and seriousness by the probability that Frederick August would again change direction.

Decision-timid

Enscheidungsscheu – literally decision timid. In simple English: afraid to make a decision.

„Mit dem Kopf durch die Wand” – trying to go through the wall with their head. Impatience. „Die Hausaufgaben nicht gemacht” – haven’t done their homework. Aktionismus. Actionism. Cowboy mentality. 

Germans see these as American tendancies, and believe that they are based on a lack of training, technical competence and methodology. “They simply have not learned these things,” is their explanation.

On the other hand, Americans view the German approach as time-consuming and academich-philosophical. German decision making can come across as decoupled from the goal which is to take. Germans, from the American perspective, take subjective factors too little into consideration. Their analysis is too complex, going well beyond the needs for making a decision.

Americans see their German colleagues as overly careful, far too scientific and schematic-tool oriented. They are reluctant to consider input based on experience and common sense.

Germans give the impression of striving to complete the perfect analysis, which in turn should be some kind of guaranty for the perfect, and therefore risk-free, decision. All of these are signs to Americans that their German colleagues in the end are simply afraid to make the tough decisions.

Citizens exposed

Towards the end of 2014, the German Postbank conducted a study with the goal of identifying the good policies which Germans enforce with regard to their financial matters. The results were summarized in article titled When it comes to money, Germans are bureaucrats who are afraid to take risks:

“Like a pillar of economic wisdom, the desire to have a higher income looms above all other factors. The remaining results are actually more reflective of the ‘financial illiteracy’, which the Germans are already often credited with.

In this way, the study exposed the citizens as being fearful bureaucrats, who above all just want to increase their personal wealth through taxation, saving, and maintaining better control of their finances, rather than earn money through smart investing, or saving for retirement.”

Risikoscheu – A fear of risks: The attribute of a decision-maker to prefer the path of lesser risk – and thereby most minimal loss – when confronted with several alternatives which have an equal anticipated gain. This may mean waiting longer for the same reward, or even settling for a lesser gain, if the chances are greater that it will be received.

Nuclear energy? No thanks!

The German anti-nuclear-energy movement began as a social movement back in the 1970’s. It was directed against civilian consumption of nuclear energy. In comparison to other European countries, the movement has also received both the strongest and most continuous support in Germany. The anti-nuclear-energy movement is strongly connected to the environmentalist movement: Greenpeace, BUND and Robin Hood, for example, categorically reject the use of nuclear energy.

The accident on Three-Mile-Island in 1979 and the catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986 provided the movement with new fuel. In 2000, the Schroeder-Fischer government began the process of phasing out the use of nuclear energy throughout the country.

While in 2010 the Kohl-government was gearing up for an extension of the run-time of the remaining nuclear plants, the German reaction to the nuclear incident in Fukushima in 2011 forced Chancellor Merkel, an advocate of nuclear energy, to reconsider this decision. Germany now plans to phase out nuclear energy completely by May 30th, 2022.

Fukushima ultimately resulted in an acceleration of the phasing-out of nuclear facilities in Germany. One year after Fukushima Chancellor Merkel defended her decision: “As we have witnessed, risks emerged in a highly developed industrial country, which we never would have considered to be possible. That is what convinced me that we should accelerate the phase-out”.

Meanwhile, Japan continues to invest in the nuclear industry. Great Britain is planning the construction of a new atomic plant. Even in France Fukushima could not slow the success of the nuclear industry. And in the USA, Fukushima also had no significant impact on opinions on nuclear energy held by the President and other politicians.

The German anti-nuclear energy movement and the nation’s response to Fukushima demonstrate the unique understanding that Germans have of risk.

Germany. Geography. Risk.

How a people understands risk is based on its experiences as a people, on the decisions it has made and on their ramifications. Decisions take place within a concrete context, within certain parameters, such as geography. Germany lies in the middle of Europe, has always had a number of neighbors, some friends, some foe, others neutral.

Germany’s topography offers little protection. In the East vast flatlands flow into the steppes of Russia. Never a maritime power, Germany to the north has only narrow access to the high seas. With the exception of the Rhine River, there are also no natural barriers in the West offering protection.The Alps to the south offer protection, however.

Compared to such countries as the U.S., China, Russia, Germany has limited natural resources. The U.S. is a continental nation, defended by oceans to the East and West. Great Britain, once a great power, has forever enjoyed the protection of the seas as an island nation.

Any mistakes Germany made in its relations with its neighbors and the powers beyond was felt directly by its people. Time and again in its history devastating wars were fought on German territory, decimating its population and ravaging its economy. For some of the wars the German people have themselves to blame. For others they were victims.

Risiko or risk from Italian risico: to do something involving a certain degree of chance, with possible negative effects; possibility of significant loss, failure.

Germans often say auf Nummer sicher gehen, literally to play the safe number, when they want to avoid unnecessary risk. Germans prefer to “check twice and be sure”. They check, test, question, analyze. They’re often considered to be overly detailed, risk averse, even pedantic in their approach. Being particularly careful may test one’s patience, but the Germans would rather be safe than sorry.

Or lieber den Spatz in der Hand, als die Taube auf dem Dach, figuratively “better a bird in the hand than two in the bush“.

Think first. Then act.

Germans often have the impression that their American colleagues gather too little information before making a decision. Valuable information sources are not tapped into. Comparisons are made “on thin ice.” Early indications based on subjective sources are not questioned critically.

All these reservations go against the German belief in erst denken, dann handeln – think first, then act. For richtig denken – literally right or correct thinking, in the German context means holding down (controlling) the natural impulse to act until the situation has been analyzed and the consequences of actions thought through.

It should be of no surprise, therefore, that Germans often see American analysis as insuffiently stringent. They see a narrow and incomplete focus on only certain aspects of the decision to be made. They fear that the Americans overestimate their ability to do a sauber – clean analysis.

This is underlined by what the Germans believe is an American tendancy to take subjective information too strongly into consideration. They are surprised when their counterparts do not use those tools and standards which have proven to be successful.

In the end Germans see their Americans colleagues as too pragmatic, too inaxact. Insufficient results are accepted too quickly. This is very difficult for Germans to accept as a people which places so much emphasis on avoiding errors via accepted tools and standards, errors which could be the source of a Systemzusammenbruch – literally system collapse. Germans see themselves sliding into danger which can only be stopped through analysis performed twice or even three times over.

Better a bird in the hand

“Besser den Spatz in der Hand als die Taube auf dem Dach” – better a sparrow in the hand than a dove on the roof – is a popular German saying expressing the German aversion to risk.

Aversion to risk and conservativeness go hand-in-hand. Never want too much, be satisfied with what you have.“ Den Mund nicht voll nehmen.” – Don’t bite off more than you can chew.

Only 13 percent of Germans invested in stocks and shares during 2014. Despite rock-bottom interest rates, the majority of savers continued putting their money into trusted bank savings accounts and fixed-return financial products.

74 Billion Dollars

On May 7th, 1998 Jürgen Schrempp, CEO of Daimler, and Bob Eaton, CEO of Chrysler appeared together at a press conference in London to announce a merger between the two companies. It was emphasized that this was not a takeover by one company of the other, but rather a fusion between equal parties. Schrempp deemed the merger of Daimler and Chrysler “a match made in heaven”.

After two years, Co-chairman Eaton announced his resignation, leaving Schrempp to be the sole head. In 2006 Schrempp passed this position on to Dieter Zetsche. By March 2007 the first speculations began to emerge that DaimlerChrysler would sell the ChryslerGroup.

Since the merger, Chrysler had reduced its net worth by 35 billion Euros, while the net worth of DaimlerChrysler has been reduced by another 50 billion by the end of Schrempp’s resignation in 2005. On May 14th, 2007 the sale of ChryslerGroup to Cerberus was announced. During a special general assembly on October 4th, 2007 it was officially decided to rename the company Daimler AG.

For Mercedes-Benz this merger to DaimlerChrysler AG seriously damaged the company’s image, which many attribute to quality issues and cost-cutting. The leading role which Daimler-Benz AG once had in the auto industry has still not been completely restored.

A study conducted by the consulting firm McKinsey estimated that the company’s value had dropped during Schrempp’s reign by 74 billion dollars.