Manifest Destiny and the Mexican-American War (1846–1848). President James K. Polk’s administration pursued rapid territorial expansion under the banner of “Manifest Destiny.” Polk pressed for quick action in diplomatic and military disputes, favoring decisive moves to secure territory rather than protracted negotiations. This approach led to the swift annexation of vast western lands, reflecting the American preference for speed and adaptability in decision-making.
military
“Ok, let’s go”
D-Day Landings (June 6, 1944). General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s decision to launch the Allied invasion of Normandy was made under immense pressure, with weather and intelligence uncertainties. Despite imperfect information, Eisenhower famously gave the go-ahead with the words “OK, let’s go,” understanding that waiting for perfect conditions could mean missing the opportunity entirely. The bold, timely decision was crucial to the success of the operation and is often cited as a defining example of American decisiveness and willingness to act quickly.
How will Germany spend €100 billion?
Deutsche Welle: Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a historic increase in military spending. It included a one-time sum of 100 billion Euros to swiftly upgrade the armed forces, and a pledge to spend at least 2 percent of Germany’s economic output on defense every year.
So what exactly is Germany planning to buy with these billions? Germany’s government has just announced it’s activating its early warning plan in anticipation of possible shortages of gas supplies from Russia.
Economy Minister Robert Habeck stressed that there are currently no shortages, but that the government would be establishing a crisis team to monitor the situation more closely. The move follows Russia’s demand for gas payments in rubles, which Germany and other western nations have rejected.
German WWI planning
The outbreak of World War I demonstrated changes in warfare and warplans of both sides were thrown into disarray. This video looks on a strategic level how Germany attempted to find its path to victory in this new situation.
Otto von Bismarck is supposed to have said to Germans: “The biggest wisdom in the war is to know when to stop when you are succesful.”
Mike Tyson definitely said: “You can have all the plans in the world till you get punched in the face.”
Why the Schlieffen Plan failed
The Schlieffen Plan was the blueprint for Germany’s army to avoid a two-front war with Russia and France. It was supposed to be the solution for a quick victory against arch enemy France by invading Belgium and the Netherlands to circumvent French defenses.
Helmut von Moltke adapted the original plan by Alfred von Schlieffen and ultimately failed when the Germans were beaten at the Battle of the Marne. The video explains the numerous reasons why the Schlieffen Plan was doomed to fail.
The Schlieffen Plan
The Schlieffen plan of attack used by the German armies at the outbreak of World War I. It was named after its developer, Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833–1913), former chief of the German general staff.
To meet the possibility of Germany’s facing a war against France in the west and Russia in the east, Schlieffen proposed that, instead of aiming the first strike against Russia, Germany should aim a rapid, decisive blow with a large force at France’s flank through Belgium, then sweep around and crush the French armies against a smaller German force in the south.
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Military Aid to Ukraine
Modern German Political Decision-Making (e.g. Military Aid to Ukraine): Recent decisions, such as sending military aid to Ukraine or providing German-made tanks, have been characterized by lengthy internal debate and demands for contextual clarity. Germany’s government typically seeks broad consensus among coalition partners and ministries, and only acts after extensive information gathering and negotiation. Allies often note Germany’s hesitancy, but when a decision is finally made, it is highly committed and rarely reversed.
Treaty of Versailles (1919)
After World War I, Germany was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed heavy reparations and territorial losses. Despite being in a weakened position, German negotiators insisted on a detailed, point-by-point examination of each clause, challenging the fairness of the reparations. They employed a structured, fact-based approach, attempting to justify why certain demands were excessive. The treaty’s severe terms were perceived as a violation of the principle of fairness in agreements – a lasting grievance in the German psyche.
“I am not convinced!“
Entschuldigen Sie, ich bin nicht überzeugt! – “Excuse me, I am not convinced!“ In 2003, at the International Security Conference in Munich, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer ended the debate against his American colleague Donald Rumsfeld with this reproachful outcry.
But what had happened? Of what was Fischer not convinced? The debate was on the topic of aiding the intervention of U.S. military forces in Iraq. Rumsfeld wanted support from Germany, but the German government under the direction of Chancellor Schröder and Fischer strictly declined his request.
At the conference, Rumsfeld was making one last attempt at getting the still-doubtful Germans on board with his agenda. Nevertheless, his reasoning that Iraq was working on weapons of mass destruction, supporting terrorist groups, and ignoring the UN, was not enough to convince the German side.
The evidence was too scant, the intervention plans too poorly prepared, and the timing of the operation seemed badly selected. It would be better just to give diplomacy another chance, rather than send German soldiers into an adventure with an uncertain end and questionable justification.
Presumably, Fischer (a former participant in the student protest movement of 1968) was drawing on more recent German history to strengthen his resolve in declining. And in this case, he now has history on his side; the Iraq war indeed evolved into just the disaster which he had always warned it would be.
2003. The Munich Security Conference. Then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer challenges then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “to make the case” for war in Iraq. Watch mins. 1:00 to 1:25, where Fischer speaks directly to Rumsfeld.
Führen mit Auftrag – Elements
Führen mit Auftrag – very loosely translated as leading by mission – is the foundational leadership principle in the German armed forces, and has been since the early 1800s. It has six key elements:
1. Decision making: Those with the most expertise should be involved. The team analyzes the Auftrag (mission), the parameters of the situation, and the possible options to complete the mission. This is the basis for making the optimal decision and for maintaining motivation and morale within the team.
2. The Auftrag describes the goal: The core task of military leadership is to issue well-defined Aufträge, missions. The focus is on defining the end state, not the specific action taken to reach it. Define the goal clearly, allow as much tactical freedom as possible. The path to the goal is best defined by those at the front. A clear Auftrag allows the tactical level to make necessary adjustments due to situational changes independent of their leadership.
3. Context and boundary conditions: The Auftrag includes a description of the mission‘s boundary conditions. The tactical level needs to understand how its mission fits into the broader strategic picture. They should be informed and understand the strategic thinking two level above their own. This allows the tactical level to make independent decisions should next-level leadership not be reachable.
4. Resources: Critical to mission completion is providing the tactical level with all necessary resources. Anything less is not only unfair, it threatens team morale and the mission itself. Capable commanders do their best to prevent a gap between mission and resources.
5. Coordination of forces: If the Auftrag requires action by several units, disciplines, organizations, then it is critical to clarify lines of authority and of communication. Overlaps should be avoided, areas of integrated approaches well defined.
6. Communications and reporting: Information flow needs to be set both on the tactical level and between the tactical and strategic levels. Progress reports are critical not only within military units, but also between the military and their civilian commanders.