politics

“Teutonic Obsession“?

The British newspaper The Telegraph published an article by Jeremy Warner about the geopolitics of the European Central Bank and the Euro-Crisis. The fact that the bank had only now started the process of quantitative easing was in large part due to Germany’s previous efforts to resist this.

However, the German’s resistance against these measures taken by the ECB was not due to the German’s experiences with hyperinflation during the time of the Weimar Republic, but rather traces back to much profounder factors found deep within the German psyche: the ancient Teutonic obsession with legality and rules.

Could this also be the reason why the German response to proposals for money-saving measures, bail-outs, and troika made by the Greeks is a always the same resounding statement: “The Greeks must stick to the rules”?

But where do rules become necessary, in order to assure reliability, stability and continuity, and where must one deviate from them due to changes in circumstance? Does not every change in strategy incorporate breaking the rules of a time gone-by?

Is Jeremy Warner’s statement about a so-called ancient Teutonic obsession with legality and rules even historically accurate?

Political Consensus

Gerhard Schröder was chancellor of the red-green – Social Democrats plus Green Party – government from 1998 til 2002, and then after reelection from 2002 til 2005. In his first term the Social Democrats and the Greens had a majority in the Bundesrat, the Upper House, where the sixteen German states are represented to co-decide with the federal government on national policy. The Schröder government had little difficulty passing the legislation they had proposed during the election campaign.

In 2002 the situation began to change, however. Federal elections led to another majority for the Social Democrats and the Greens. But at the state level they lost their majority within a few years. The opposition – Christian Democrats and Free Democrats – had gained the majority in the Bundesrat and were able to block legislation proposed by the Schröder government.

Nonetheless, Schröder‘s coalition was able time and again to craft legislation in a way which served the interests of those state governments led by opposition parties. His government was able to compromise and collaborate with those critical German states led by the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats.

Parliamentary Democracy

In a parliamentary democracy the government is created out of and by the parliament. It is dependent on the support of the parliamentary party factions. The government, created by a majority coalition in the parliament, can also be deposed via a vote of Mißtrauen, mistrust. On the one side this gives the parliament a high degree of control over the government. On the other, however, the government can only govern by passing laws, which in turn requires strict discipline among the coalition parties in the parliament.

The presidential system is a different approach to democratic government. It‘s government – or administration, the executive branch of government – is elected directly by the people, and is therefore independent of the legislative branch, the Congress (Senate, House).

The United States is the most prominent example of the presidential system. There are also democratic forms of government which have aspects of both the parliamentary and presidential systems, such as France.

Germany is a classic parliamentary democracy. With one exception, federal elections have never produced a party with an absolute majority. Governments are always based on a coalition of two parties, who elect a chancellor to form a government. The chancellor then, in close negotiation with the coalition partners, chooses members for the cabinet. Traditionally these are the most powerful leaders of the coalition parties in the largest German states. They are power brokers in their own right and are considered to be capable of replacing the chancellor at any time.

Since all laws must be passed by a majority of the parliament, the government and its majority coalition in the parliament must work closely together. Any failure to pass a law is a clear signal of a possible break in the coalition.

Should the government, however, misuse its power over and against its colleagues in the parliament, the parliament can at any time dissolve the government via a vote of mistrust, which in turn leads to new elections. The government, should it not have the necessary support of parliament, has the same power to dissolve the parliament and force new elections.

In this sense, the chancellor‘s power is based on close cooperation not only with those cabinet members with their own independent political power base, but also with the influential factions in the parliament. The German chancellor is in the cabinet a primus inter pares, a first among equals.

“There you have it!”

In February 2015 Christian Lindner, the head of the Free Democatic Party (FDP), gave a speech in Dusseldorf, the capital of the German state Northrhine Westphalia.

“Entrepreneurship is a signal of confidence in a culture’s future. When people start new companies, they are not only creating a better future for themselves, they’re creating jobs for others.”

Hardly into his speech a state representative from the ruling Social Democrats (SPD) called out smugly that Lindner, indeed, had had personal experience with startups.

Lindner pounced on the opportunity. “Aha, look here. You say that I have experience. It is true, dear colleague. During the highpoint of the new economy I founded a company. It was not successful. But the leader of your party, the premier of this great state, in her speech today stated clearly that Germans should not stigmatize those whose startups fail.”

Lindner continued: “There you have it, in your own caucaus, Madame Premier, a colleague who doesn’t listen to you. This is exactly one of the reasons why so many people prefer to work as civil servants, instead of starting a company. For if they are successful then you Social Democrats want to tax and reallocate their profits. And if they are not successful, then they are derided.”

Auf YouTube wurde die Rede bereits millionenfach angeklickt. In DIE ZEIT vom 19. Februar 2015 schreibt Feliks Eyser, ein Gründer, der im zweiten Anlauf erfolgreich war, in einem Artikel mit dem Titel „Wer wagt, verliert“:

Within hours the speech was uploaded to YouTube and clicked on over a million times. A week later DIE ZEIT, a respected political weekly, published an article by Feliks Eyser, whose first startup failed but whose second succeeded.

The article’s title was „Wer wagt, verliert“ – those who risk, fail. This is the opposite of the well-known German figure of speech “Wer wagt, gewinnt” – those who risk, win.

“Failure is a part of entrepreneurship just like sore muscles are a part of sports. Those who start a company run the risk of failure. Courage is essential. Perhaps more people in this country would have that courage if a busines failure were not seen as human failure.”

Interestingly, Eyser wrote scheitern not seen as versagen. Both terms translate into failure. Could this mean that Germans see in failure human or personal failure?

Frederick August the Procrastinator

Frederick August, the King of Saxony, was one of history’s great procrastinators. While he began as one of Napoleon’s greatest foes, he soon became his greatest ally. In return, Napoleon elevated him from prince elector to king.

But by 1813, his alliance with Napoleon would cause him to lose the Battle of Leipzig. Though Frederick August was careful in attempting to side himself with the great forces who opposed him, a treaty that he had made with Austria eventually dissolved. Taken into captivity by the Prussians, Frederick August was forced to turn more than half of his territory over to his archrivals.

But why was Frederick August on the losing side of the Battle of Leipzig? Historians consider him to have been incapable of making decisions. He is credited with coining the phrase “no decision is better than a bad decision.”

During the revolt he spent his time sitting almost apathetically in the basement in the city hall of Leipzig. To add to the confusion, Frederick August was an exceptionally unpredictable monarch; very few rulers changed their mind so often.

Not only was he incapable of making decisions, but as soon as a decision was made it essentially would have lost all meaning in the moment of its creation, having already been undermined in significance and seriousness by the probability that Frederick August would again change direction.

“Sitting out“

Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was often innaccurately portrayed as the master of Aussitzen (sitting out) by journalists and political elites alike. Instead of approaching a problem directly, it was said that he would wait until it would either resolve itself or people would lose interest in it.

But even with Kohl’s retirement from politics,“sitting out“ political issues supposedly has not gone out of style. At least according to Stern maganzine, which claims that Angela Merkel has become the new representative of this style of governing. As Wochenmagazin wrote in March 2010: “Angela Kohl – wait it out, weigh it out, sit it out. Chancellor Merkel reveals herself ever more strongly to be an adept pupil of the greatest sitter-outer Helmut Kohl”.

More accurate is that Kohl was and Merkel is a master of thinking things through, patience, and building consensus.

Fragestellung

A Fragestellung is literally a question formulation. It is the definition of the question to be addressed. Before Germans make a decision – answer a question – they place great effort into first being sure that they have a common understanding of the decision to be made, of the question to be answered.

From the German point of view it is not enough to be capable of making decisions, to answer complex questions intelligently, if you haven’t first defined accurately the decision to be made, the question to be answered.

Germans engage in a discussion upfront about: What is the nature of the decision we are about to make? What are its implications for other areas of our work? Are we addressing the right question? Are we in agreement about what decision we are making and why?

Schmal (narrow): Old High German smal: small, narrow; narrow in width, as seen in profile; little, few, not enough, bare, barren.

Breit (wide): Of greater length in profile; as in size(s), measurements, a certain width; large, stretched; in large measure.

The German word schmal is often used to describe poor performance, low quality, something deficient. An engineer who does delivers poor results is referred to as a Schmalspuringenieur, literally a narrow lane engineer. A Schmalspurforscher is a scientist who has achieved little professionally. Schmalbrüstig – literally small or narrow in the chest – is someone who is unathletic.

Grundsätzlich: Relating to what is foundational; in accordance with a principle, in principle; actual, fundamentally; in general, as a rule.

The German people are serious. They value principles, deep-felt beliefs. Er hat keine Prinzipien. He has no principles, is a very serious criticism in the German context. To have no principles, to have no values, which guide one in their behavior, is considered to be a sign of weak character. Germans tend to have discussions about bottom-line thinking, beliefs, and principles.

The German political parties have their Grundsatzprogramm, their foundational political principles, which are formulated for the long term. The Grundsatzprogramm encompasses their foundational political beliefs, upon which the specifics of their political platform are formulated. Their election campaigns are closely aligned with these ideas. The Grundsatzprogramm is seldom modified. To go against it, to follow a political course which strays from it, invites internal rebuke and sanction.

“I am not convinced!“

Entschuldigen Sie, ich bin nicht überzeugt! – “Excuse me, I am not convinced!“ In 2003, at the International Security Conference in Munich, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer ended the debate against his American colleague Donald Rumsfeld with this reproachful outcry.

But what had happened? Of what was Fischer not convinced? The debate was on the topic of aiding the intervention of U.S. military forces in Iraq. Rumsfeld wanted support from Germany, but the German government under the direction of Chancellor Schröder and Fischer strictly declined his request.

At the conference, Rumsfeld was making one last attempt at getting the still-doubtful Germans on board with his agenda. Nevertheless, his reasoning that Iraq was working on weapons of mass destruction, supporting terrorist groups, and ignoring the UN, was not enough to convince the German side.

The evidence was too scant, the intervention plans too poorly prepared, and the timing of the operation seemed badly selected. It would be better just to give diplomacy another chance, rather than send German soldiers into an adventure with an uncertain end and questionable justification.

Presumably, Fischer (a former participant in the student protest movement of 1968) was drawing on more recent German history to strengthen his resolve in declining. And in this case, he now has history on his side; the Iraq war indeed evolved into just the disaster which he had always warned it would be.

2003. The Munich Security Conference. Then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer challenges then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “to make the case” for war in Iraq. Watch mins. 1:00 to 1:25, where Fischer speaks directly to Rumsfeld.

“Problembewusstsein nicht vorhanden”

In the summer of 2014 several members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the German Bundestag visited Washington, DC. Their talks were overshadowed by media reports that the U.S. had been spying on the  Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, Germany’s intelligence service) and the Verteidigungsministerum (German Ministry of Defense).

The Germans tried to help their American colleagues to understand the Empörung (indignation, anger, outrage) felt by the German people. They did not get very far, the ARD (one of Germany’s major tv networks) stated in their special report titled Problembewusstsein nicht vorhanden – Problem-consciousness non-existent.

The German parliamentarians left Washington with little hope that their colleagues in the Congress would be able to get the American intelligence agencies under control, if Members of Congress themselves were not aware (conscious) of the problems damaging German-American relations.

Party and Platform First

German political conventions demonstrate clearly that in Germany, substance is more important than form. For decades the podium was set to the side, with the stage dominated by up to fifty party leaders sitting in three or four extended rows.

And although in recent years the podium has been moved front and center, the stage continues to be dominated by party leaders. The message is clear. The party and its political platform remain front and center.

German political parties also do their best to keep hidden their internal power struggles. Instead they are presented as debates over substance which should be resolved internally and speedily. The politicians involved are quick to state that the battle is not about themselves or political office, but about important issues of substance.