Germany. United States. Persuasion.
Mark works in the U.S. for a German company — an automotive supplier from the Stuttgart area, a hundred years old, ten thousand employees, €1.75 billion in revenue. It supplies not just VW and Mercedes but GM, Ford, and Chrysler.
First-rate technology, clear structure, a real drive to innovate. Mark came up through engineering and supply chain, then moved into sales and marketing, and is now Vice-President for North America.
The opportunity. Mark and his top people saw a serious market opening. Detroit was interested — GM, Ford, Chrysler — while the German carmakers were more reluctant. The project meant modifying one of the company’s best-selling products, which meant significant investment and close cross-Atlantic collaboration.
Mark’s team did it right, American style. They pinned down the market demand through customer discussions. They took it to engineering, who saw the potential and signed on. They refined the business case and brought it to the finance people, who weren’t convinced — so the team worked three straight days on the numbers until even the skeptics were on board. Engineering, yes. Finance, yes.
Game day in the U.S. Now they needed the North American board. Mark assembled his presenters and built the argument with care. For four straight weeks they worked, meeting Saturdays to tighten and rehearse, recruiting colleagues to play skeptical board members, pizza every Saturday night. Intense, and genuinely fun.
On the day, they won. The critical questions came, there were moments they nearly lost one powerful board member, they ran well over time. During breaks they huddled over laptops, redoing calculations, pulling in experts to answer detailed questions. High tension, but they stayed consistent and cohesive — and that cohesion convinced the board.
A few issues stayed unresolved, and that was fine with everyone. Innovation involves risk. At the end of the marathon, the North American CEO broke into a grin: “Great work, team. We’re behind you 100%. I’ll get you a date to present in Germany. But remember — our German colleagues will do their best to find the weaknesses in your plan. Dress warmly, as they’d say.”
Out in the hall, the team cheered and slapped backs. Mark pumped his fist. Yes. Let’s celebrate.
How they’d won. Every round had made the team more confident and more personally identified with the project. And Mark can sell — emotion and inspiration balanced with facts, on the principle his father drilled into him: sell yourself first, then your product or service. Risks were never called problems — consciously, deliberately, they framed problems as opportunities. “Always look for the silver lining.”
Every report and meeting mixed hard data with stories and war stories from past projects, told by people who could make them come alive — one engineer was so good at simplifying the complex they called him the Great Simplifier. Mark kept everyone focused on the future, literally counting slides to make sure the future outweighed the past.
The innovation had to feel like a leap, even where it was incremental. Colleagues joked he should have gone into politics or advertising — a bit of a Don Draper. And on the weak points, Mark took a frankly American line: if the audience doesn’t ask the hard question, we’re not obliged to volunteer our weaknesses. Let them pull it out of us. Caveat emptor.
Game day in Germany. The presentation to the parent board, and the meetings afterward with engineering, quality, sales, and commercial, did not go well. Some went very poorly. By noon on day two the team was unsettled and didn’t know why. They even began to suspect the Germans opposed the project simply because it came from the U.S.
They did what had worked at home — worked day and night, answered unanticipated questions, reached out to every possible supporter on both sides of the Atlantic. The Germans listened patiently and sincerely. None would commit to anything. Every meeting felt like a battle: argument, counter-argument, fact, counter-fact, experience, counter-experience.
By Thursday the team was physically and emotionally spent, with only minor meetings left and no time even for the sightseeing their hosts kept recommending. At breakfast Mark asked for odds. The team said fifty-fifty. They flew home Friday feeling defeated.
The answer came two weeks later. The German board thanked them for a motivating and at times very interesting presentation. They saw many positive aspects. The project would not be funded.
Neither side did anything wrong by its own culture’s rules. Both did everything wrong by the other’s. And the Americans never saw it coming.
What went wrong
Sell yourself, or step aside. Mark’s whole method — sell yourself first, put heart and soul on display, carry the room with conviction — is how you persuade in America. Germans are taught the opposite: be objective, separate self from substance, let the argument speak for itself.
So the very energy that won the U.S. board made the Germans wary. They read the self-selling as show over substance, even as an attempt to distract from weak arguments.
Opportunities, or problems. Mark’s team framed every risk as an opportunity and spoke relentlessly positively. Germans expect the word problem when there is one — not “challenge,” not “issue.” The relentless optimism didn’t reassure them. It made the team look naive, and made the Germans suspect that difficulties were being hidden.
Show your weak points — or be caught hiding them. Mark’s “let them pull it out of us” was, to the Germans, close to dishonest. They are proud Schwachstellenanalytiker — weak-point analysts. They spotted the soft spots early, waited for the Americans to address them, and grew suspicious when they didn’t. What Mark saw as normal salesmanship, they saw as withholding, perhaps even deception.
A sales pitch, or the start of a process. In America a strong presentation asks for the decision, and can win it. In Germany a presentation begins the decision process — it doesn’t end it. Mark pushed for a yes. The Germans deliberately gave no reaction, because for them it was far too early to signal anything. The push for closure itself looked unserious.
A leap, or continuity. The team sold the project as a bold leap into the future. Germans value continuity and careful, incremental change, and worried the Americans hadn’t defined the starting point clearly enough — that they’d rush off in the wrong direction, and move the company off a path it had held for two decades.
The bottom line: to the Germans, Mark and his team did not come across as competent. Brilliant, energetic, likeable — and not competent by German standards. The pieces without the whole. Stückwerk.
What their AI could have seen
Mark’s team had no way to know that the approach which won America would lose Germany. Their company’s AI could have.
With cultural intelligence embedded, the AI the team already used could have shown them, as they built the German presentation, that Germans persuade and are persuaded differently — that self-selling reads as show, that unnamed risks read as concealment, that a presentation in Germany opens a decision rather than closing it.
Not in a seminar years earlier. In the moment, as they prepared, inside the tools they already worked in — and available to their German counterparts too, who might have seen that the Americans’ optimism was enthusiasm, not evasion.
The same opportunity. Presented once for America, once for Germany, each on its own terms. It might have survived four days in the Stuttgart area.
What did it cost?
The company will never see an invoice for this. But consider what it lost — and only you can put real numbers to your own version of it.
The lost business. Detroit wanted this innovation. Had the project been funded, and had the German OEMs followed — as they might have — this was the payoff, the real return, at a company doing €1.75 billion a year. What is a conservatively estimated share of that opportunity, forgone, worth?
The stakeholders who backed it. A U.S. board committed to this “100%” and put its credibility behind it to the German parent. When Germany said no, what did that cost the standing of the American leadership who championed it — and their appetite to bring the next opportunity forward?
The stakeholders who watched. Detroit’s OEMs saw the German board reject an innovation they wanted. Will they now expect less from this supplier, and take the next idea elsewhere? What is that erosion of a customer relationship worth, over the years it shapes?
The people. Mark and his best people poured themselves in and flew home defeated, fully backed at home and rejected abroad. What does that cost in their motivation, their next initiative, their reasons to stay — and in every colleague who watches how it turned out?
The pattern. Now count the Game Days already unfolding in your own company — capable people persuading brilliantly by their own culture’s rules, and failing by the other’s. What does a year of them cost, in opportunities won at home and lost across the border?
Back to Three Reasons.